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CANARY IN A COAL MINE? FEDERALISM AND THE FAILURE
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990
JEFFREY GEIGER*

With the advent of the New Deal, the federal regulatory state exploded
in both size and scope. The increasing role of the national government in the
day-to-day affairs of citizens, however, has not provoked substantial action by the
federal courts. Throughout most of the past fifty-five years, the Supreme Court
has played with kid gloves, deferring to Congress's determination of the
constitutionality of its actions.' As the degradation of the environment moved to
the forefront of the nation's political and social agenda, the federal government
reacted through the formation of what can only be loosely termed a "partnership"
between the federal and state governments.2 Despite tremendous gains in
environmental remediation and awareness, the nation's pollution problems still
remain.' Moreover, after a quarter century of "cooperative federalism," 4 cracks
are appearing in the very foundations of the federal environmental structure.
Born of the environmental problems of our nation, the Clean Air Act of
1970 ("CAA")5 has likewise grown in size and scope over the last iwenty-five

* Mr. Geiger received his A.B. in International Relations Theory from the College of William and

Mary in 1992 and expects to receive his J.D. from the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the
College of William and Mary in May of 1996.
1. See Deborah J.Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988).
2. See John E. Daniel, The Balance of Roles: EPA and the States Under the Reagan
Administration, in THE NEW FEDERALISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: TAKING STOCK 21 (1982)
[hereinafter TAKING STOCK].

3. US. Gets a Mixed Environmental Report, UPI, Apr. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File. Lead emissions decreased by 98%, and sulfur oxide emissions dropped 30%
since the enactment of the Clean Air Act in 1970. Id. However, almost one million people live
in regions that do not meet air quality standards. Id. Air pollution is linked to increasing rates of
asthma, and an estimated 60,000 premature deaths in the nation's most polluted cities. Id.
4. "Cooperative federalism" envisions a partnership between the federal and state governments.
The relationship seeks to achieve the benefits of federalism by delegating the responsibilities
necessary to meet stated objectives between the states and the federal government. But see, E.
Donald Elliott, Keynote Address at the Nineteenth Annual Conference on the Environment (May
1990), in FEDERAL VERSUS STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: CAN A NATIONAL

POLICY BE IMPLEMENTED LOCALLY? 1 (1991) (noting cynics' description of "cooperative
federalism" as a way for the federal government, which faced a deficit, to spend money "off
budget" by establishing requirements to be implemented by the states).
5. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q).
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years. States and individuals, however, under the banner of "New Federalism," 6
are signaling a growing trend toward political reformation. In part a result of
frustration with regulations imposed by the federal government, the states are
demanding substantive changes in the federal-state working relationship, and
explicitly calling for revisions in the CAA. 7 Under attack for its increasingly
paternalistic emphasis on federal authoritarianism, the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 ("1990 Amendments") await judicial determinations on their
constitutional fitness, the result of suits filed by the States of Missouri and
Virginia.'
Notwithstanding the current rebellion against the national regulatory
system, a reexamination of the precepts of federalism is needed to evaluate
existing environmental programs with an eye toward reconstruction. Skirmishes
over the 1990 Amendments do not represent an isolated by-product of legislative
shortcomings or executive mismanagement; rather, they symbolize the "canary in
the coal mine" and indicate the need for a realignment of the roles shared by
federal and state governments under the CAA. The current situation did not
develop overnight. Part I accordingly traces the development of the CAA. Part
II assesses the changes to the CAA in the 1990 Amendments. 9 Part III briefly
discusses the values of a dual system of government and the emerging federalist
doctrine. Part IV presents a background on the constitutional issues raised by
Virginia and Missouri in their judicial attacks on the sanctions provisions of the
6. "New Federalism" roughly translates into a movement seeking a balance of power between the
federal government and the states. The notion contemplates a restructuring of the federal-state
relationship in order to embrace the perceived values of federalism, such as accountability, diversity,
innovation and political liberty. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, The New Federalism,A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 1995, at 76. See also, Society and Politics States' Rights: Govs Say Washington Has Too
Much Power, GREENWIRE, Mar. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Greenwire File
(citing state frustration with environmental mandates and plans to convene a state conference to
"consider ways of reinvigorating the Constitution's Tenth Amendment").
7. See generally, Air Pollution: EPA Administrator Will Not Fight Bill to Repeal FIP Requirements
in 1977 Law, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1998 (Feb. 17, 1995) (discussing testimony by governors
before House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Commerce Committee
demanding significant changes in CAA) [hereinafter EPA Administrator]; Texas Joins States
Fighting CAA, EPA Emissions Testing Mandates, 32 Air Water Pollution Rep. No. 40 (Mar. 6,
1995) (citing growing efforts by states to resist enforcement of CAA provisions) [hereinafter Texas];
Virginia Governor Tells Senate Panel Restraint Needed on Clean Air Act Rules, 25 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 47, at 2387 (Mar. 31, 1995) (Virginia Governor George Allen testifying that CAA needs
to be reopened).
8. Missouri v. United States, No. 4:94-CV-1288 ELF (E.D. Mo. filed July 1, 1994); Virginia v.
United States, No. 3:95-CV-21 (E.D. Va. June 12, 1995) (dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction); Virginia v. Browner, No. 95-1052 (4th Cir. filed Jan. 12, 1995) (appealing final
agency action disapproving Virginia's CAA program).
9. While each successive enactment of the CAA led to the disappearance of numerous forests in
the ensuing legal commentary, it is imperative to understand the regulatory structure, its successes,
and its failures in order to provide a basis for understanding the need to reform the CAA and to
analyze it within the ambit of New Federalism.
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1990 Amendments. Acknowledging the important roles that the federal and state
governments share in air pollution prevention, Part V argues for a shift in the
Part VI concludes that the CAA should be
structure of the CAA.
restructured-lest the canary dies, and the miners with it.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE

CAA

Highlighted by fears over nuclear fallout and "killer smog," the problems
°
of air pollution led to a public outcry in the early 1960s." While air pollution
1
control laws existed in the past, the CAA amended earlier enactments " and
provided the current regulatory structure. The CAA aimed then, as now, "to
protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the
2
public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population."'
A. Structure of the CAA
The CAA sought to clean up the nation's air within a miraculous five
years" through the promulgation by the Environmental Protection Agency
4
("EPA") of national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS").1 The NAAQS
target and place limits upon specific pollutants affecting air quality. Aided by
federal funds, the states develop state implementation plans ("SIPs") to enforce

10. See KIRKPATRICK SALE, THE GREEN REVOLUTION: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT, 1962-1992, 18, 19 (1993); ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., A CENTURY OF AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL: WHAT'S WORKED; WHAT'S FAILED; WHAT MIGHT WORK 1549, 1586, 1588 (1991)

(noting link between focus on air pollution problems and air pollution regulations). "Air pollution
has been defined as a group of chemical compounds that 'are in the wrong place or in the wrong
concentrations at the wrong time."' GARY C. BRYNER,BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN
AIR ACT OF 1990 42 (1993) (citation omitted).
11. The CAA dates back to the Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1964)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). This was in part based upon Congress's findings that:
[T]he growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by
urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles,
has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, including
injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of
property, and hazards to air and ground transportation.
42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2).
13. Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 6, 110(a)(2)(A), I10(e), 84 Stat. 1676, 1680, 1682 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(A), 7410(e) (1988)), amended and repealed, Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 101-b,-d, I 10(a)(2), (e), 104 Stat. 2399, 2404, 2408 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7410 (1991)).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 751 l(f), amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,
§§ 108(b)(2), 111(0(1), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7411() (1993)).
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these standards. 5 The EPA retains ultimate authority over all air pollution control
programs. 6 A state's failure to offer an acceptable SIP empowers the EPA either
17
to amend the SIP or to implement a federal implementation plan ("FIP").
Additionally, the CAA mandated substantial reductions in automobile emissions,
and provided for citizen suits against polluters and the EPA for inadequate
fulfillment of statutory obligations. 8
B. ProblematicFoundations
While the CAA's enactment rested partly upon the urgency and fears
regarding the nation's air pollution problems, 9 the primary rationale centered
upon the failure of the states to control air pollution.2" The inadequacy of state
programs has been traced to a slow, out-moded legal system, an inability to deal
with interstate pollution problems, the pressure of economic competition among
the states, and the absence of a broad public consensus in support of increasing
state expenditures on environmental enforcement. 21 Despite the documented
regulatory failure of states to manage competently their natural resources,
Congress still granted "[e]ach State ...primary responsibility for assuring air

quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State., 22 A reflection
of the realistic demands in protecting the environment, the states play an integral

15. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
16. See id.
17. Id. § I I0(c)(1).
18. See id. § 7521; 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
19. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
20. See REITZE, supra note 10, at 1586 (noting that failure of most states to "allocate adequate
resources to air pollution control indicated that federal action was required"). Despite reluctance
by Congress to empower federal officials, no state had established a complete set of pollution
standards by 1970. See BRYNER, supranote 10, at 81. Moreover, during floor debate on the CAA,
Senator Edmund Muskie, Chair of the Senate Committee on Public Works' Subcommittee on
Environmental Pollution, stated:
In 1963, Congress recognized that the Federal Government could not handle the
enforcement task alone, and that the primary burden would rest on States and
local governments. However, State and local governments have not responded
adequately to this challenge. It is clear that enforcement must be toughened.
...and [that] the Federal presence and backup authority must be increased.
116 CONG. REC. 32,901 (1970).
21. Herbert H. Humphrey & LeRoy C. Paddock, The Federaland State Roles in Environmental
Enforcement: A Proposalfor a More Effective and More Efficient Relationship, 14 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REv. 7, 12 (1990). Cf Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs:A Study in Political
Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 823 (1990) (arguing that states
continue to lack serious commitment and adequate mechanisms with which to regulate their natural
resources).

22. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a). Moreover, Congress mandated that the EPA Administrator "shall
encourage cooperative activities by the States and local governments for the prevention and control
of air pollution" and authorized states to enter into compacts. Id. § 7402(a), (c).
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role in administering and enforcing national environmental laws and are
responsible, in large part, for their success.23
Cooperative federalism, the watchword of early environmental
enactments, envisions "national unity with local diversity," culminating in a
federal-state partnership." The EPA provides oversight, and the state government
applies for delegation of particular programs, induced usually through a
combination of federal pressure, program subsidies and public opinion.25
Employing traditional "command and control" principles, the EPA then specifies
uniform environmental standards and delegates a CAA program to the state. The
state then implements and enforces the standards.26
C. Regulatory Assumptions
Any advantages of such a regulatory system are linked to the underlying
assumptions originally justifying federal enactment of the CAA. First, Congress
assumed that the states lacked the expertise, resources and knowledge required to
create detailed scientific pollution standards.27 As a centralized agency, the EPA
was uniquely situated to act as an information clearinghouse for research and
development.2" With uniform national standards and decentralized enforcement,

23. Paul R. Portney et al., The EPA at "Thirtysomething," 21 ENVTL. L. 1461, 1472 (1991)
(stating that "state and local governments are responsible for the implementation, monitoring, and
enforcement necessary for any national environmental law to succeed").
24. See supra note 4; J. William Futrell, The Administration of Environmental Justice, in
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW:

INTEGRATING

NATURAL

RESOURCE

AND POLLUTION

ABATEMENT LAW FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 120 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993).
25. See Futrell, supra note 24, at 120.
26. "Command and control" simply implies the direction of entities to produce no more than a predetermined amount of pollution. See BRYNER, supra note 10, at 20 (discussing "command and
control" principles and criticisms of its rigidity and inefficiency).
27. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
28. An often-cited advantage to centralization ofenvironmental regulatory structures is the presence
of economies of scale. Economies of scale exist when a firm's long-run average costs fall as
production increases. The EPA may enjoy economies of scale in the setting of environmental
standards because the regulatory process requires the culling of large amounts of scientific data on
pollutants. If a state agency sought to duplicate the EPA's work, it would be inefficient or wasteful.
See Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics ofFederalismand the ProperScope of the FederalCommerce
Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 565-67 (1994).
However, the advantages of economies of scale are limited. First, government activities
are often characterized by diseconomies of scale-long-run average costs rise as output increases.
Id.at 566. Frequently, this results from a firm's increase in bureaucracy as it grows in size and
scope. Second, the mere presence of economies of scale does not mandate centralization of all of
the functions of production. Id EPA could simply collect the pollution information and allow
states to set standards that would maximize their individual preferential levels of social welfare.
Id.
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assurance of local flexibility was presumed.29
Second, the federal government had that "can-do" spirit, ending the
Depression through the New Deal, winning World War II, and placing a man on
the moon. Indeed, Congress expressed its belief that "[f]ederal financial
assistance and leadership [was] essential for the development of cooperative
Federal, State, regional, and local programs to prevent and control air pollution."3 °
Moreover, the negative externalities of air pollution were not content to remain
within political boundaries.3' Thus, federal regulation was justified where the
costs associated with pollution were imposed by one state upon another state.32
Third, in the absence of federal regulation, many in Congress concluded
that states would not manage the environment in a manner consistent with the
goals of federal regulations. 3 The "race-to-the-bottom" theory contemplates

29. This embodies the goal of cooperative federalism. See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(4). John Jay also noted that:
[O]nce an effective national government is established, the best men in the
country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to
manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted influence, may
place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive
departments; yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other
qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national
government,-especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and never
experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the
States. Hence it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and
the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise,
systematical, and more judicious than those of individual States, and
consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more
safe with respect to us.
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 3, at 11 (John Jay) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (a)(1) (1988). Congress found that the nation's population is not confined
to individual geo-political boundaries. Id.This finding implied that pollution would migrate from
state-to-state.
32. See LeBoeuf, supra note 28, at 570-71. If a factory emits air pollution upwind of a
neighboring state, the failure of the polluting state to enact effluent regulations imposes costs on the,
other state. Id.(citing as an example Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915)).
Such costs represent a transfer of wealth from the residents of the pollution-receiving state to the
residents of the polluting state. Id. at 570-71. Moreover, the costs produce a net loss to society
when the level of pollution differs from that which would maximize social wealth. Id. at 571.
33. See James M. McElfish, Jr., Minimal Stringency: Abdication of State Innovation, 25 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003 (Jan. 1995) (stating that, in adopting federally mandated regulation
minimums as state regulation maximums, certain "states have ...continued the 'race to the bottom'
that Congress [has] decried," and concluding that, in absence of federal regulations, many states
would not likely regulate to same degree as federal government now requires); REITZE, supra note
10, at 1613-14 (describing states as "willing to sacrifice the environment" in "their attempts to
attract money and jobs to the state").
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lessening environmental quality as states compete for industry.3 4
Traditional economic theory holds that the socially optimal level
of pollution reduction is the level that maximizes the benefits that
accrue from such reduction to the individuals who breathe the
polluted air, minus the costs of pollution control. To achieve this
optimal reduction, a regulator must force polluters to internalize
the costs that they impose on the breathers.3"
"Within the national market then, other forums being equal, firms will try to
reduce the costs of pollution control by moving to the jurisdiction that imposes
the least stringent requirements."36 In theory, states should analyze the costs of
air pollution relative to the benefits of industrial activity, which include job
creation and tax revenue increases.37 Because air pollution is not necessarily
confined within state boundaries, some of the costs of transboundary migration
of air pollutants is imposed upon non-residents.38 Thus, Congress assumed that
it must regulate the environment to insure clean air throughout the United States.39
Yet, while Congress was concerned with interstate externalities, much of the CAA
was premised on the assumption that states would enact suboptimal air pollution
regulations to attract industry.4"

34. See Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Commerce: Rethinking the "Race-to-theBottom" Rationalefor FederalEnvironmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1214, 1216
n.14 (1992) (citing Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212
(1977), and the article's argument that the "race-to-the-bottom" theory assumes a lack of
cooperation among the states premised upon insurmountable transaction costs); LeBoeuf, supra note
28, at 573-74, 579 (discussing the Coase Theorem's inability to provide a solution to interstate
externalities primarily due to insurmountable transaction costs). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7402
(mandating that EPA Administrator encourage cooperation among various governmental entities to
prevent air pollution and to allow states to enter into interstate compacts).
35. Revesz, supra note 34, at 1214.

36. Id.
37. Id. at 1215.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(1) (1988). See also LeBoeuf, supra note 28, at 570-71.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(4) (1988); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1982) (recognizing that prevention of environmentally destructive interstate
competition is justifiable use of commerce power). See also Revesz, supranote 34, at 1217 (stating
that federal regulation is justifiable means of slowing environmental degradation).
40. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1988)
(prohibiting emissions which interfere with another state's air quality); 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (1988)
(disallowing reductions in emissions limits due to the height of "smoke stacks"); 42 U.S.C. § 7426
(1988) (requiring SIPs to identify proposed new and modified major sources which may impact
another state's air quality); Revesz, supranote 34 at 1224-27 (discussing congressional justification
of CAA provisions on "race-to-the-bottom" theory).
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Finally, federal regulation of air pollution under the CAA was supported
by Congress's distrust of states and localities.' Whereas distrust is a component
of much of the above-stated rationale, it did not prevent Congress from delegating
CAA programs to the states. 2 Nevertheless, subsequent interpretations of
Congress's intentions represent patent paternalism that inevitably belie meaningful
cooperative federalism.43 Indeed, not only are many of Congress's assumptions
deeply problematic in terms of both economic analysis and federalist principles,
but many of the assumptions no longer hold true."

II. 1990 AMENDMENTS
The CAA of 1970 embodied a landmark attempt to rein in the problems
associated with air pollution, and in large measure, it was successful.4 ' A costbenefit analysis of the CAA declared it a "winner, '46 and emission levels of lead,
particulates, and carbon monoxide dropped substantially between 1970 and
1990. 4' Although the EPA concluded that pollution control efforts stemming
from the 1970 Amendments resulted in significant reductions in air pollution, "its
goal-protecting public health with an adequate margin of safety-is far from
being achieved. 4 8
A. Passage of the 1990 Amendments
In 1990, after more than a decade of legislative and executive gridlock,
President George Bush signed S. 1630, 49 the 1990 Amendments to the CAA, into
law. Bush stated that his proposal "was designed to improve our ability to
control urban smog and reduce automobile and air toxic emissions, and to provide

41. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. The apparent distrust also is evident in
Congress's acceptance of the "race-to-the-bottom" argument which reflects a deep-seated belief that
states cannot regulate in a manner to guarantee maximum social benefit.
42. See U.S.C. §§ 7401(a)(3), 7407(a); Portney et al., supranote 23, at 1472; see also supra text
accompanying note 23.
43. See Revesz, supra note 34, at 1217.
44. See infra Parts III and V.
45. See supra note 3; REITZE, supra note 10, at 1632 (noting that while CAA has been successful,
increases in population and energy act to nullify CAA gains).
46. See Steven Pearlstein, The Myths That Rule Us: In the Debate on Regulatory 'Reform,' Six
Legends Bear a Closer Look, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at H I (noting that economists' study
found CAA's benefits outpaced its costs).
47. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS
REPORT, 1990 1-2 (1991); supra note 3.
48. See BRYNER, supra note 10, at 48-49 (citing ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
ECONOMIC INVESTMENTS: THE COST OF A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT (1991)).

49. S.1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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the enforcement authority necessary to make the law work. , 50 Unfortunately, in
trying to "make the law work," Congress did not learn from the lessons of the
past.
A statutory failure is no reason not to try again, and Congress in
1990 attacked the intransigent nonattainment problems with the
same set of tools that had been tried and found wanting
earlier-a revised redesignation authority, new deadlines, harsh
SIP and permit provisions, and stiff sanctions. The most
conspicuous feature of this new package, though, is that it looks
a great deal like the old, with the ruffles and flourishes of twenty
years experience. 5
B. Structure of the 1990 Amendments
Prior to the 1990 Amendments, CAA programs were structured so that:
(1) the SIPs established source-specific emissions levels and applied the NAAQS
to all sources of air pollution, (2) stringent technology and permitting
requirements were mandated for new sources, and (3) specific air pollution
problems were addressed as they arose. 2 In addition to substantially revising
existing CAA programs,53 the 1990 Amendments also create an operating permit
program which placed all of the CAA requirements for a given source into one
document. 4 Rather than regulate sources through a SIP, the 1990 Amendments
require a state to provide source-specific regulation.55 As under previous
enactments, the state holds "primary responsibility for assuring air quality within
the entire geographic area comprising such State,"56 and the EPA continues to
retain its preeminent authority over the SIPs and expands its oversight to all
individually issued permits. 7
Additionally, the 1990 Amendments mandate that states develop and
implement "inspection and maintenance" ("I&M") programs for ozone
nonattainment areas classified as "moderate and above. 58 I&M programs are

50. Statement by the President on Signing the Bill Amending the Clean Air Act, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 1824 (Nov. 15, 1990) (emphasis added).
51. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 211 (2d ed. 1994).
52. J. GORDON ARBUCKLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 120 (12th ed. 1993).
53. See REITZE, supra note 10, at 1608-12 (providing overview of 1990 Amendment revisions);
ARBUCKLE ET AL., supra note 52, at 120.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b) (1995); ARBUCKLE ET AL., supra note 52, at 140.
55. See ARBUCKLE ET AL., supra note 52, at 139-40.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1988).
57. See id. § 7661a (1995); 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b) (1995).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511 a).
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designed to reduce air emissions from "mobile sources" by testing vehicle
emissions systems for compliance with air quality standards. 9 The status of an
attainment area is measured by reference to the air quality in that particular
geographic region.6" For moderate areas, states must implement "basic" I&M
programs which permit vehicles to be tested and repaired at the same location.6
More controversial, however, are I&M programs for areas classified as "serious
ozone nonattainment areas and above.16 2 These so-called "enhanced" I&M
programs require motorists63 to test their vehicles at a centralized facility and have
repairs at another facility.
C. Structural Concerns
Although passage of the 1990 Amendments resulted in a
number of new
64
regulatory programs, they have not resolved existing structural shortcomings.
First, the CAA's fragmented, single-media approach continues unabated.
Although adoption of source-specific permitting brings the CAA closer to other
environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act, "[d]etail diminishes EPA's
discretion to attempt new approaches and robs EPA of the administrative
resources that could be used to implement them. 65 Second, while uniform
environmental standards provide industry with stability and certainty and allow
for a minimum standard of air quality throughout the nation,66 they are
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7511a (1985); 40 C.F.R. § 51.350 (1994).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(e) (1988).

61. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.353 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 751 la(b)(4) (1995); 42 U.S.C. § 751 la(a)(2)(B)
(1995).

62. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.353 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 7511 a(c)(3) (1988).
63. 40 C.F.R. § 51.353 (1994).
64. See, e.g., supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
65. Craig N. Oren, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: A Bridge to the Future?, 21 ENVTL.
L. 1817, 1839 (1991); see also Robert M. Sussman, EPA at the Crossroads, ENVTL. FORUM, Mar.Apr. 1995, at 14, 17 (arguing that EPA needs to adjust its organizational structure to adopt multimedia approaches and reinforce concept of pollution prevention).
66. See Futrell, supra note 24, at 118; see also BRYNER, supranote 10, at 84 (noting that President
Nixon's support for CAA's reauthorization was motivated in part by concerns about uniform
standards for industry). The support for uniformity has been recognized as an additional
justification for federal involvement:
[T]o control interstate competition and to grant all citizens a certain minimum
level of health and welfare protection, the national government should set
minimum nationally uniform health and welfare standards. This approach, of
course, lies behind such centerpieces of current law as the national ambient air
quality standards .... Indeed, this approach is now part of our culture, and
very few persons propose doing away with it .... I would attribute at least
some of this inaction to the long standing lack of attention to issues of state's
rights ....
William F. Pedersen, Jr., Federal/StateRelations in the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and
the RCRA: Does the PatternMake Sense?, in TAKING STOCK, supra note 2, at 6.
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economically inefficient, ignoring the advantages of decentralized decisionmaking
and flexibility and responsiveness to local conditions and needs.6 ' Third, the
CAA directs that pollution control should be driven by technological
achievability,6" not relative risk or cost-benefit analysis.6 9 Whereas opponents
contend that assessing the relative risk of certain activities usually ends up
"justifying pollution,"7 ° supporters argue it "is essential if we are to know 'when
a regulatory expenditure is not a good investment, and decide whether we want
to spend money elsewhere to save a lot of lives."' 7 Given limited financial and
natural resources, regulators should be permitted to concentrate efforts on those
air pollution concerns which pose the greatest threats to human and ecological
health.
Finally, despite an avowed distaste over the states' ability to regulate air
pollution, Congress expressly "granted" primary responsibility for air quality to
the states.72 Subsequent interpretations of the CAA, however, appear to bestow
omnipotence in air pollution matters to federal agencies.73 Although largely a
problem of construction and interpretation, the failure to realize Congress's
statutory intentions for concurrent jurisdiction and a more cooperative framework
continues to hamper efforts aimed toward achieving optimal air quality under the
CAA.74

67. See Futrell, supra note 24, at 118; Edward L. Strohbehn, Jr., The Bases for Federal/State
Relationships in Environmental Law, in TAKING STOCK, supra note 2, at 11 (acknowledging that
"some environmental problems involve concerns that differ significantly from one locality to
another, making national solutions possibly inappropriate or inefficient in an economic sense. And
some environmental concerns involve matters that have been the subject of state and local control
.

.

.

.");

David Clarke, A Contract Without Green Ink,

ENVTL. FORUM, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 32

(Noting that, while uniformity may not have been "hot" topic in the past, many politicians are
making "power devolution their top priority, repeating their battle cry ... that 'one size does not
fit all"'); BRYNER, supranote 10, at 20 (noting criticism that uniform standards are more expensive
than they need to be for some facilities).
68. For example, in the 1990 Amendments, Congress shifted the basis for regulation of air toxins
from health-based to technology-based regulations, requiring maximum achievable control
technology. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (1995).
69. Although the cost-benefit versus "best technology" debate fills countless academic journals,
serious economic questions have been raised about current CAA provisions mandating wasteful
technology.
70. Bryner, supra note 10, at 153-54.
71. Id. at 154 (quoting Graeme Browning, Taking Some Risks, 1991 NAT'L J. 1279); see also
Pearlstein, supra note 46, at H4 (describing $31 million mandated expenditure by Amoco refinery
to eliminate benzene from waste water treatment system despite ability to reduce four times as much
benzene from other processes for only $6 million).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a); supra note 22 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
74. See infra Parts III and IV.
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D. Administrative Concerns
While structural problems abound, they are the result of legislative
misdrafting and could be mitigated through successful implementation efforts.
Congress's distrust of the executive branch during the legislative process,
however, has led to the inclusion of major obstacles in the 1990 Amendments that
will deleteriously affect any attempt to achieve long-term success.75 A by-product
of congressional frustration with the EPA and a divided government, the 1990
Amendments furnish very detailed provisions with specific deadlines for
compliance. 76 Unfortunately, the deadlines prove to be an administrative hurdle
to efficient implementation: "It is unnecessary to look beyond the CAA for
evidence that deadlines are not self-enforcing. It is somewhat surprising, then,
that the SIP revisions and sanctions relied upon to encourage compliance depart7 7
only modestly from the patterns found wanting in the 1977 version of the law.",
Likewise, despite requests from some state officials for "more direct
guidelines and more precise standards" under the CAA in order to deal with the
greater number of regulated sources, 78 the 1990 Amendments "represent an
that converts an already intricate statute into a
extremely detailed approach
'monster of complexity."' 79 Increased regulation has the potential for making the
EPA, already constrained in its flexibility by the 1990 Amendments, even less
responsive to state and local needs, frustrating any existing notion of cooperative
federalism.80 The rigidity inherent in the statutorily-imposed deadlines and the

75. See BRYNER, supra note 10, at 129-31.
76. See Sussman, supranote 65, at 16. See also Oren, supra note 65, at 1830-31 (noting irony that
environmental forces in Congress burden EPA with voluminous details and numerous deadlines in
order to "protect" EPA from executive branch discretion).
77. RODGERS, supra note 51, at 223-24. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(3) (Supp. 1992) (requiring
EPA to "promulgate, administer, and enforce" operating permit program for recalcitrant states by
November 15, 1995); EPA Administrator,supranote 7, at 1998 (stating that EPA would not oppose
legislation repealing CAA requirement that EPA develop FIP for nonattainment areas in California).
78. Steve Novick & Bill Westerfield, Whose SIP Is It Anyway? State-FederalConflict in Clean Air
Act Enforcement, 18 WM. & MARY J. OF ENVTL. L. 245, 269-73, 272 n.152 (1994).
79. Oren, supra note 65, at 1828. See ARBUCKLE ET AL., supra note 52, at 149 ("EPA will be
faced with implementation responsibilities that far surpass those that have been assigned to virtually
any other administrative agency."); Sussman, supranote 65, at 18 (disparaging "tyranny of statutory
deadlines"). See, e.g., Date for Section 112(g) Compliance Delayed Until EPA Completes Final
Rule, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1995 (Feb. 17, 1995) (noting implementation difficulties;
EPA will not tie compliance with 42 U.S.C. §7412(g) to acceptance of a state's Title V program
until after final rules have been issued).
80. See generally,GOP GovernorsRefrainfrom UrgingMajor Rewrite of CAA by Congress, 1 Air
Water Pollution Rep. No. 3 (Feb. 13, 1995), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (Governor Pete
Wilson stated: "We welcome clear federal standards but demand flexibility to meet the standards.");
Texas, supranote 7 (noting that Texas demanded flexibility in meeting 1990 Amendment pollution
control standards and "rejected" enhanced I&M testing program); Changes, ClarificationsPromised
by EPA in Response to Requestsfrom State Groups, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 2285 (Mar.
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complexity of detail deplete the resources necessary for an effective execution of
the 1990 Amendments.8"
E. Probabilityfor Success
The numerous statutory and administrative hurdles placed by Congress on
the EPA substantially hinder any possibility of reaching long-term success."2 The
run-away paternalism fostered by successively detailed enactments erodes the
EPA's relationships with the states and has exhausted the utility of a top-down,
command-and-control regulatory approach. The challenge lies in reviewing
established patterns and looking toward restructuring the federal-state relationship.

III. FEDERALISM
Behind the initial justifications for federal intervention into environmental
regulation festers a fundamental problem at the core of the CAA and the 1990
Amendments-a loss of perspective on the goals and advantages of federalism.
In examining the relationship between the federal and state governments, it is
imperative to review not only the values of a decentralized system, but also the
more recent attempts to define federalism in the dawning of the twenty-first
century.
A. Values of a FederalistSystem
While Congress has enjoyed plenary powers to regulate under the
Commerce Clause for much of the past fifty years, there exists a resurgent
recognition of federalist values and an acknowledgement of the need to avoid
"obliterat[ing] ...distinction[s] between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government." 3 The aim of federalism should84
focus on capturing the benefits of centralization, without the attendant costs.
Embracing the concept of federalism, legal commentary has centered upon the
relative efficiency of state and local governments, and on the protection of

17, 1995) (noting that EPA attempted to respond to 65 requests for 1990 Amendment clarifications
submitted by states) [hereinafter Changes].
81. See Sussman, supra note 65, at 17 (discussing "resource shortfall" at EPA); Howard Latin,
RegulatoryFailure,AdministrativeIncentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1693
(1991) ("[Tlhe SIP revision process constitutes an expensive drain on EPA and state resources that
would otherwise be available for implementation of diverse CAA programs."); supra note 4.
82. See BRYNER, supra note 10, at 165-66.
83. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1643 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
84. See LeBoeuf, supra note 28, at 557.
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individual political liberties within our dual system of government."
Federalist values provide a number of advantages to environmental
policymaking. First, decentralization provides a citizenry with the ability to
participate more directly in the democratic process and to have a greater
awareness of the costs and benefits of legislation. It also permits accessibility to,
and accountability of, elected officials.8 6 Under the CAA, greater federal
authority over air pollution regulation has the potential for less responsiveness to
the needs of local and state officials." "[W]here the Federal Government directs
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision." 8
Second, diversity among the states allows citizens to "create the type of
social and political climate they prefer."89 Diversity among subcentralized entities
allows for innovation as governments attempt to match publicly supplied goods
to the tastes and preferences of their constituencies.9" Thus:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. 9'

85. See, e.g., Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 847 (1979) (discussing importance of state sovereignty in federalist system).
86. See LeBoeuf, supra note 28 at 571-72; Kaden, supra note 85, at 860-63; Merritt, supra note
1, at 3.
87. See F. WILLIAM BROWNELL ET AL., CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK 28 (1993). By delegating power
to the EPA, members of Congress benefit by appearing to address environmental problems. Yet,
their distance from EPA decisions allows members to downplay their own responsibility for the
regulations--"[t]he result is a loss of democratic accountability." Harold Krent & Jim Rossi,
Avoiding a Mistake with CorrectionsDay, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at 22, 25.
88. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). "The theory that two governments
accord more liberty than one requires for its realization two distinct and discernable lines of political
accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal Government; the second between the
citizens and the States." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
89. Merritt, supra note I, at 8. See LeBoeuf, supra note 28, at 558-59 ("A basic shortcoming of
a unitary form of government is its probable insensitivity to varying preferences among the residents
of the different communities.").
90. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (recognizing that federalism "makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry"). See
LeBoeuf, supra note 28, at 566-68 (describing interstate competition for residents by offering
citizens public goods which match their tastes).
91. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See John
Pendergrass, Laboratory Reports, ENvTL. FORUM, May-June 1995, at 8 (noting that, while
environmental policy experimentation by 50 states can be inefficient, such experimentation is
extremely valuable).
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While Congress's delegation of responsibility to the states to meet the NAAQS
would appear to allow for flexibility and innovation,92 the 1990 Amendments
stifle "state laboratories" with excessive details, deadlines, and requirements for
stringent oversight by the EPA. 93
Finally, in a dual system, the "principal benefit of the federalist system
is a check on abuses of government power." 94 "Just as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front . . . ,9'This "double security" protects an
individual's liberty to participate in public life and to influence the political
processes by drawing lines of distinction between federal and state government. 96
The principle of accountability is meaningless without the ability to employ it
through active participation in the democratic process.
B. New Federalism
Discussions on the merits of a federalist system touch at the heart of a
movement pursuing a more "conservative" interpretation of the Constitution under
the rubric of "New Federalism." "New Federalism," as defined by President
Ronald Reagan, seeks to: (1) permit individuals to perform all of the functions
that can be accomplished privately; (2) place control over public functions in the
hands of the level of government which is both capable and close to the
communities it serves; and (3) reserve federal action for those problems that only

92. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1988) (granting primary responsibility for air quality attainment to states).
See Strohbehn, supra note 67, at 10 (noting Congress's recognition of importance of "state
laboratories" by allowing enactment by states of stricter standards and encouraging greater state
roles).
93. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
94. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
95. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The balance of power under the 1990
Amendments is disrupted, however, because the EPA has the authority "to overrule state
environmental offices, [which is] a blunt repudiation of federalism." S.REP. No. 228, 101st Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1989), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1990, at 8815 (1993) (statement of Sen. Syms).
96. Kaden, supra note 85, at 860-63. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992)).
If... the federal and state governments are to control each other ...and hold
each other in check by competing for the affections of the people ... those
citizens must have some means of knowing which of the two governments to
hold accountable for the failure to perform a given function. "Federalism serves
to assign political responsibility, not to obscure it."
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the national government can assume.9 7 The overriding message is: dial 911 if
there is a fire; call the Pentagon if there is a military crisis. To a large degree,
the principles of New Federalism mirror the values envisioned by the Founders
of our dual system.98 As lawyers and politicians "dust off' the Tenth
Amendment99 and confront the regulatory roles assigned to federal and state
governments, the implications for the 1990 Amendments remain unclear.
Under the catch words of "states' rights" and "federalism," however,
many are challenging the authorizing assumptions under which the CAA was
enacted. Echoing cries for increased governmental accountability, personal
responsibility, and individual opportunity, Republican candidates in the 1994
midterm elections sought to achieve a greater balance of power between the
federal government and individuals in their self-styled "Contract With
America."'0 ° Federalists, however, were less concerned with substantive changes
on the federal level, and more concerned with returning ample power to the states
Instead,
to balance the equation and allow federalist values to flourish.''
Congress focused on changing the federal government's regulatory role from "Big
2 while the states assailed the federal government's
Daddy to Big Buddy,"'
03
regulate.
to
authority
Rather than addressing air pollution problems and the structure of the
CAA, critics have sought, at least symbolically, the wholesale dismantling of the

97. Economic Report of the President: Annual Message to the Congress, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.

Doc. 162, 164 (Feb. 10, 1982).
98. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
100. NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA

(1994).

101. See Reuben, supra note 6, at 76-77. "Restoring true federalism lies at the heart of the
conservative revolution .... Returning power to the states will allow people to reconnect with their
government and to be able to participate in it more directly, which in turn makes government more
accountable." Id. at 77 (quoting Clint Bolick, civil rights activist with the Institute for Justice).
Apparently, this sentiment is shared by the public. A recent survey commissioned by the
nonpartisan Council for Excellence in Government found that 64% of respondents favored
concentrating power in the state governments, and 62% supported state or local governments
running air and water quality programs. The DimmingAmerican Dream, ST. LEGISLATURES, JulyAug. 1995, at 7.
102. See Reuben, supranote 6, at 77. Congressional attempts to federalize crimes and place limits
on tort awards does not evince a clear understanding of federalist principles and specifically intrudes
upon traditional areas of state regulation, overruling both the common law and the decisions of state
legislatures. Ironically, there is a conspicuous absence of measures dealing with federal subsidies
to the grazing, timber, mining and recreation industries. Joan Hamilton, Getting Polluters Off
Welfare, SIERRA, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 30-31.
103. See Reuben, supra note 6, at 77; see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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1990 Amendments.' °4 Aside from calls to repeal existing CAA programs,
discussion regarding the roles accorded the federal and state governments in
environmental policymaking has been non-existent." 5 This is unfortunate as the
real focus should be on the federal-state partnership in a modem society.
IV. ENTER THE DRAGON: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS
ON THE 1990 AMENDMENTS

A. States Attack Sanctions Provisions of 1990 Amendments
Challenging the constitutionality of the sanctions provisions in the 1990
Amendments, Missouri and Virginia have filed suit in federal court. 1°6 Primarily
at issue are two sanctions provisions: a cut-off of federal highway funds and a
2:1 minimum emissions offset for new and modified sources seeking permits.

104. See House Majority Whip IntroducesLegislation To Repeal SeveralPortions of CleanAir Act,
25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1787 (Jan. 20, 1995) (noting comment by aide to Rep. Thomas A.
DeLay that "[he] is making a statement with that bill" to repeal 1990 Amendments and believes that
1990 Amendments micro-manage pollution control efforts better handled by states). Among the
bills introduced were: H.R. 473 (repealing provisions dealing with toxic air emissions); H.R. 474
(repealing Title IV which deals with acid rain controls); H.R. 475 (repealing Title VI provisions
which reduce stratospheric ozone depleters); H.R. 476 (preventing motor vehicle emissions standards
from taking effect under Title II); H.R. 477 (allowing credits from emissions reduction stemming
from fleet turnovers to be applied toward emissions reduction requirements in Title II); H.R. 478
(prohibiting requirement of SIPs to include vehicle trip-reduction plans); H.R. 479 (repealing 1990
Amendments). Id. Moreover, in response to criticism from state officials, Senator Christopher
Bond (R-Mo) introduced a less restrictive version of H.R. 1158, allowing states flexibility in
choosing alternatives to the "enhanced" I&M program. See Senate RescissionsBill Would Allow
States To Choose Vehicle Emissions Program with IM 240, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2424,
2425 (Apr. 7, 1995); Tensions FlareBetween House Committees over AddressingProblems in Clean
Air Act, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 29, 1995), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (discussing
efforts at reconciling problems with 1990 Amendments).
105. In a truly bipartisan fashion, there appears to be no discussion of the future of environmental
protection. The new popular mood has a decidedly anti-environmentalist perspective. While the
public may not have forsaken environmentalist values, it "would be equally mistaken to assume that
the prevailing hostility to environmental regulation will disappear without fundamental changes in
the current framework for environmental protection." Sussman, supra note 65, at 14. Still, only
18% of polled voters desire weakened environmental protection laws. Eric Alterman, Choose Your
Poison, ROLLING STONE, Apr. 20, 1995, at 41. Voters in Virginia, for example, overwhelmingly
favor lessened government regulation, yet 61% reject less regulation of air pollution. DICK MORRIS,
REPORT ON SURVEY OF OPINIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN VIRGINIA I (Va. Envtl.
Endowment June 1995).
106. Missouri v. United States, No. 4:94-CV-1288 ELF (E.D. Mo. filed July 1, 1994); Virginia v.
United States, No. 3:95-CV-21 (E.D. Va. June 12, 1995) (dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction); Virginia v. Browner, No. 95-1052 (4th Cir. filed Jan. 9, 1995).
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1. Missouri
In January of 1993, the EPA notified the State of Missouri that it had
failed "to make a submittal as to three nonattainment plan elements required for
the St. Louis ozone nonattainment area."' °7 The EPA found that the SIP lacked
necessary revisions to its proposed I&M program, failed to adequately plan for
a required fifteen percent reduction in volatile organic compounds ("VOCs"), and
available control technology
did not submit a SIP revision applying reasonably
°8
to all major sources of nitrogen oxides.
In response to the EPA's threat of sanctions, the Missouri legislature
enacted Senate Bill 590, "authorizing the Missouri Department of Natural
Resources to establish an 'enhanced' [I&M] program which would meet CAA
requirements for 'moderate areas."" 9 Missouri alleged that implementation will
be both costly and politically controversial." 0 Moreover, it claimed the offset
sanction would have a "disastrous" impact on the St. Louis economy,"' and the
cut-off of highway funds would have a "substantial ly] adverse affect on the
economies ... of St. Louis ...and the State of Missouri as a whole."" ' 2
2. Virginia
Virginia vociferously attacked the sanctions provisions of the 1990
Amendments, filing suit in both the federal district court" '3and the federal court
of appeals" 4 following final disapproval by the EPA of Virginia's SIP." 5
Disapproval stemmed from two major disputes with the EPA regarding Virginia's
compliance with the CAA. First, Title V, enacted by the 1990 Amendments,
requires implementation of a source permitting program, distinguished from the
SIP, which is to be developed and enforced by the states." 6 The EPA found
Virginia's operating permit program unacceptable, partly on the basis of the
limited scope of Virginia's judicial review statute regarding appeals from state

107. Complaint at 10-11, Missouri,No. 4:94-CV-1288 ELF (noting also that EPA is required to
apply sanction provision per 42 U.S.C. § 7509).
108. Id. at 11-12.
109. Plaintiffs Trial Brief at 6, Missouri, No. 4:94-CV-1288 ELF.
110. Id. at 8-13.
111. Id.at 9-10 (alleging extreme losses in population, personal income, economic development,
employment, clean air and political accountability).
112. Id.at 12.
113. Virginia, No. 3:95-CV-21.
114. Virginia v. Browner, No. 95-1052 (4th Cir. filed Jan. 9, 1995).
115. Clean Air Act: Commonwealth of Virginia, 59 Fed. Reg. 62,324 (1994).
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f (Supp. 1992); 40 C.F.R. Pt. 70 (1994) (detailing extensive
requirements for Title V operating permit program).
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permit decisions in state court." 7 While the EPA has interpreted the 1990
Amendments to require broad access to a state's courts, Virginia law permits
participants in the public comment process to appeal a decision of the Virginia
Air Pollution Control Board only if the individual can establish that:
(i) such person has suffered an actual, threatened or imminent
injury; (ii) such injury is an invasion of an immediate, legally
protected, pecuniary and substantial interest which is concrete
and particularized; (iii) such injury is fairly traceable to the
decision of the Board and not the result of the action of some
will likely
third party not before the court; and (iv) such injury
8
court.1
the
by
decision
favorable
a
by
be redressed
Under EPA's interpretation of the Title V operating permit program, Virginia
must allow "any person who participated in the public comment process" access
to judicial review in a state appeals court.9
Second, the EPA found that Virginia submitted neither an acceptable I&M
program under the 1990 Amendments 2 0 nor an adequate plan for reducing VOCs
by the mandated fifteen percent.' As with Missouri, the EPA must impose the
2:1 offset and cut off highway funds in the near future, and the EPA may do so
at any time. 122 Thus, Virginia faced the "Hobson's choice of either enacting a
multi-million dollar federally conscripted regulatory program or suffering
Specifically, Virginia asserted a loss of federal
draconian sanctions.' 2 3
accountability-Congress, through the CAA, mandates that elected state officials
enact laws and issue regulations which may not be in accordance with the views
of the citizenry. 124

117. Virginia, No. 3:95-CV-21, at 1-2. The applicable federal statute mandates:
Adequate, streamlined, and reasonable procedures for expeditiously determining

when applications are complete, for processing such applications, for public
notice, including offering an opportunity for public comment and a hearing, and
for expeditious review of permit actions, including applications, renewals, or
revisions, and including an opportunityfor judicialreview in State court of the
final permit action by the applicant,any person who participatedin the public
commentprocess,and any other person who could obtain judicial review of that
action under applicable law.

42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6) (emphasis added).
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1318(B) (Michie 1993) (emphasis added).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6).
Virginia, No. 3:95-CV-21, at 2; see supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
Virginia, 3:95-CV-21 at 2-3.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (Supp. 1992).
Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 2-3, Virginia (No. 3:95-CV-21).
Id.at 27.
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The citizens of Virginia expect their state and local officials to be
accountable for the regulatory programs administered by state
agencies. Under the CAA, however, these officials had no
meaningful say in whether the Commonwealth should have such
programs. These officials-not Congress-bear the full brunt of
public disapproval. Accordingly, there is a fundamental lack of
12
federal accountability for Congress' action. 1
B. Sanctions Provisions
The 1990 Amendments created two sanctions provisions designed to
"encourage" state participation in CAA programs: emissions offsets and a cut-off
of highway funds. 126 Premised on reducing the overall pollution pie, 127 the 2:1
offsets sanction requires major sources seeking to construct or modify industrial
operations in nonattainment zones to identify two tons of VOC reductions for
every one ton of increased VOC emissions attributable to their project. 12 ' The
highway sanction empowers EPA to prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from
129
approving or funding state highway projects.
Failure to comply with the requirements for submitting and implementing
SIPs leads to mandatory sanctioning and also permits discretionary imposition of
sanctions at any time. 130 Pursuant to the mandatory sanctions provision, a
"sanctions clock" begins to run every time the EPA makes a SIP "finding of
deficiency" concerning: (1) a state's failure to submit a SIP, or SIP revision, for
a nonattainment area; (2) EPA disapproval of the SIP; (3) the completeness of a
SIP; or (4) a lack of implementation by a state of a portion of the approved
plan.' 3' After eighteen months, the EPA "shall apply" either the highway funds
cut-off sanction or the 2:1 emissions offset requirement for new or modified
major sources. 3 If a state has not corrected the deficiency within six months of

125. Id.
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509. The EPA Administrator may also withhold financial support for air
pollution planning and control programs provided under 42 U.S.C. § 7405. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a).
127. See RODGERS, supra note 51, at 218.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(5).
129. Id. § 7509(b). Exceptions are permitted for safety improvements, public transit lines, highoccupancy-vehicle lane construction, and other projects related to improving air quality. Id. §
7509(b)(I)(B)(i)-(viii).
130. Id. §§ 7509, 7661a(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1992).
131. Id. § 7509(a).
132. Id. The EPA has adopted a rule that permits it to impose the 2:1 emissions offset
automatically at 18 months, and the highway funds cut-off provision at 24 months. 59 Fed. Reg.
39,832 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 52.31 (a)-(e)).
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the first sanction, the EPA must issue the second sanction.'
Moreover, discretionary application of the sanctions by the EPA is
permitted "at any time" following a finding of deficiency. 3 4 At the end of two
years, the EPA is required to implement a FIP in any state that has not corrected
all alleged deficiencies within that time. ' Even after the EPA implements a FIP,
the sanctions remain in place until a state adopts and fully complies with SIP
requirements.
The sanctions provisions similarly impact a state's failure to submit, or
EPA disapproval of, all or a part of a Title V permitting program. 3 6 While the
permitting program uses the same SIP "sanctions clock," EPA must implement
a federal Title V program in non-complying states by November 15, 1995.' The
sanctions will likewise not be lifted until the state fully conforms with operating
permit program requirements.
C. ConstitutionalityUnder the Spending Clause
As discussed above, the 1990 Amendments link the receipt of federal
38
highway money to the adequacy of a state's SIP and operating permit program.1
Despite United States Supreme Court jurisprudence permitting Congress to attach
conditions to the receipt of federal money to encourage policy objectives,'3 9 the
1990 Amendment highway funds cut-off provision is extreme. Specifically, the
condition imposed-state adoption of federal air quality programs-is not
rationally related to federal highway funding. Furthermore, the imposed condition
constitutes impermissible congressional coercion.

133. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a). But see RODGERS, supra note 51, at 229:
Neither of these sanctions will keep recalcitrant state officials awake at night.
The threatened cutoff of federal-aid highway funding has roots in federal
environmental law going back to the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, and
serves chiefly a posturing function. And it is difficult to imagine the effects on
official behavior of incremental adjustments in an offset formula that itself is
the product of gross guesswork and unlikely enforcement.
134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(m), 7509(a).
135. Id. § 7410(c)(1).
136. Id. § 766 1a(d)(2)(A).
137. Id. § 7661a(d)(3).
138. Id. §§ 7509(b)(1), 7661a(d)(1).
139. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power to ... provide for the ...
general Welfare of the United States .... "). South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980).
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1. Linking Highway Funding to Air Pollution
As expressed in South Dakota v. Dole, 4 ' Congress's spending power will
be upheld if the imposed condition: (1) is for the general welfare, (2) bears a
reasonable relationship to the expenditure's purpose, (3) is unambiguously stated,
and (4) does not violate any independent constitutional prohibitions.' 4 ' The
highway funds cut-off provision would appear to meet the stated requirements
except that the cut-off of highway funding may not bear a relationship to the
purpose of the federal spending. Thus, in analyzing the highway funds sanction
under the Spending Clause, the main questions are whether the condition-states'
adoption of federal air quality programs-is rationally related to the
objective-improvement and construction of highways-and what is the necessary
nexus between the condition and the objective.
It has long been accepted that "the Federal Government may establish and
142
impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the project.'
However, the sanction provision lacks the necessary rationale to support its
constitutionality. The objective of highway funding is to provide for the
construction and maintenance of highways-specifically highways involved in
interstate commerce. This is not advanced or related in any way to the
development of air quality programs. Congress observed the connection between
air pollution and the increasing use of motor vehicles 43 and stated that one of the
purposes of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 was "to
develop a National Intermodal Transportation System that ... is environmentally
sound.' 44 Yet, while Congress evinces a desire for "environmentally sound"
highway projects, "federal highway funds are appropriated to facilitate safe and
efficient automotive transportation, not to achieve environmental goals.' 45
Moreover, the Supreme Court has not discounted demanding a more "direct
140. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
141. Id. at 207-08.
142. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (emphasis added).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2). See also id. § 7506(c) (requiring all federally supported
transportation projects to be part of transportation plan and transportation improvement program in
conformity with state's SIP).
144. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991).
145. See Stephen F. Smith, States Defend ConstitutionalRights Against EPA, WASH. LEGAL
FOUNDATION, Feb. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 208).
While environmental goals may be clearly reflected in Title 23 (highways) and Title 42 (CAA),
their interconnectedness does not necessarily connote a rational basis upon which to conclude that
the conditioning of funds is constitutional. If the rationale behind the highway funds cut-off is
premised upon reducing air pollution emissions from vehicles, there will no doubt be more
emissions as cars spend longer periods in operation due to increased traffic. More likely, the real
justification for the sanction is the availability of a powerful, coercive tool with which Congress can
guarantee that the EPA will not need to implement a FIP or operating permit program. It is not
surprising that the EPA announced that it would not oppose the repeal of a provision requiring it
to implement a FIP in nonattainment regions of California. EPA Administrator, supra note 7.
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relationship" between the condition and the expenditure:' 46
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion
of the general welfare, the reality, given the vast resources of the
Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause gives "power
to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the states'
jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole people,
subject to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed."' 4 7
Accepting the notion that "Congress knows best," for instance, would permit
conditioning federal Medicare and Medicaid payments to a state's adoption of
CAA programs. After all, automobiles increase the amount of VOCs in the air,
and air pollution directly impacts the population's health.' 48 Therefore, there is
"some relationship" between federal health care payments and air pollution. 49
The extensions of this argument are numerous; the flaw in logic is obvious. 5 °
While courts in the past may have been reluctant to tread upon the
legislative branches' power to regulate, it remains the job of the courts to say
"what the law is."' 51 In New York v. UnitedStates, the Supreme Court confronted
Congress's ability to regulate the disposal of low-level radioactive waste. While
disallowing outright "commandeer[ing] [of] the legislative processes,"'5 2 the
Court found that "[t]he conditions imposed [were] reasonably related to the
purpose of the expenditure; both the condition and the payment embod[ied]
Congress' effort to address the pressing problem of radioactive waste disposal."' 53
Congress addressed air pollution under the CAA; however, they did so
impermissibly, as the strings attached to the funds have been pulled taut and will
snap under a rational basis analysis.

146. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 203, 208-09 n.3.
147. Id. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)).
148. See supra note 3.
149. Regardless of whether there is "some relationship," the goal of legislation should be to
accommodate the stated objective and insure that the advantages of federalism are secured.
Obfuscation of the true owner of a particular statute sullies accountability and, in turn, political
liberty. "Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do
so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents." New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 178 (1992).
150. Cf Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631-34 (1995) (criticizing and invalidating limitless extension of the
Commerce Clause power to regulate possession of firearms near schools).
151. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
152. New York, 505 U.S. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
153. Id. at 153 (citation omitted).
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2. CongressionalCoercion
Intimately connected to both the highway funds cut-off provision and
Tenth Amendment analysis is Congress's coercion of state governments into
regulating for the federal government under the CAA. The Supreme Court has
"recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by
Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into
compulsion.""54 Unfortunately, the Court in Dole did not provide a standard with
which to test the coercion theory and further declared that one cannot equate mere
temptation with coercion.' 5 5 The Court did suggest, however, that a conditional
grant must "remain[] the prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in
fact."' 56 Theoreticians may well point to Virginia's ability to retain federal
highway funds by: (1) enacting liberal standing laws; (2) developing an EPA
approved SIP and permit procedures, and (3) regulating air quality to the
satisfaction of the EPA officials. The alternative is federal operation of the
permitting program, federal issuance of a FIP, and a possible end to federal
highway funding with the attendant economic sacrifices that this would entail.
Thus, theoretically, Virginia possesses a "choice;" however, factually and
realistically, Virginia has but one option and that is to submit to federal mandates.
Regrettably, the Court in New York provides little guidance as to how to
resolve questions involving choice. In discussing the conditional granting of
funds to states, the Court implied that the constitutional distinction lies in the
citizenry's retention of "the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will
comply."' 57 As noted, the 1990 Amendments do allow states to decide whether
or not to accept highway money; however, it is a catch-22 situation. States may
either regulate and reap political hell or choose not to regulate, lose the highway
money, and reap political hell.
While the Court in New York acknowledged that conditional funding is
not guaranteed to be constitutionally fit,'58 the court's distinction appears to lie in
semantics. The Court required direct compulsion of states by the federal
government to implicate constitutional concerns over accountability.' 59 When a
state is compelled to act, "[a]ccountability is thus diminished when, due to federal
coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of

154. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
155. Id.(quoting Davis, 301 U.S. at 590). "[T]o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to
coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doctrine is the
acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which choice becomes impossible." Id.
156. Id. at 211-12.
157. New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
158. Id.at 167 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08) (requiring conditions to bear some relationship
to purpose of federal expenditure).
159. See id.at 168-69.
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the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.""16 According
to the decision in New York, constitutional concerns over accountability are not
necessarily triggered by an actual loss of accountability. Rather, the focus is on
whether the state had a choice in accepting the conditioned grant. The analysis
ignores factual losses of accountability in the absence of express federal mandates.
In New York, the Court avoided directly applying federalist principles in order to
circumvent difficult questions regarding the scope of Congress's powers.
Similarly in Dole, the temptation/coercion debate expresses judicial
reticence to engage in second-guessing the legislative branch; yet it is the job of
the courts in a federal system to say "what the law is." 16' The author of the New
York opinion, Justice O'Connor, dissented in Dole and called for limitations on
Congress's use of the spending power.'6 2 Narrowly construing "coercion" as a
feature present only in direct congressional mandates fails to do justice to
federalism, given the realities of an unrestrained federal legislature's ability to
obfuscate the lines of accountability.
Despite broad federalist implications, courts have been unwilling to utilize
a coercion theory due to the difficulties of its application. In Nevada v.
Skinner,'6 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the
coercion argument had been mentioned in both Dole and Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis, however, the theory "has been much discussed but infrequently applied
in federal case law, and never in favor of the challenging party. '
While a
broader examination of the ability of courts to reach workable decisions regarding
Congress's coercive use of the spending power is beyond the scope of this paper,
courts routinely make life-death decisions, examine dormant Commerce Clause
limitations, and assess the validity of myriad economic, political, social and
scientific evidence. Thus, while Missouri and Virginia may be on shifting ground
in asserting a coercion theory, they are not without constitutional foundation.
D. Constitutionality Under the Tenth Amendment
Virginia and Missouri both challenge the sanctions provisions of the
CAA, alleging that they unconstitutionally coerce the states into regulating for the
federal government. Both the mandatory offsets and the revocation of highway
funding present fundamental concerns under the Tenth Amendment, which
reserves powers not delegated to the federal government or the people, to the

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
limit

Id. at 169.
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 217.
884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 448 (addressing challenge to federal requirement that state post 55 mile-per-hour speed
on all affected highways).
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states.' 65 Virginia and Missouri's Tenth Amendment claims flow from Congress's
use of the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power
"to regulate Commerce... among the several States."' 166 Recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence suggests that Congress's use of the Commerce Clause has limits and
such limits restrict Congress's ability to compel or coerce states into performing
regulatory actions in the name of the federal interest. Underlying the federalist
resurgence in Court doctrine, however, is the explicit need for a choice, and that
such a choice, even in theory, may uphold the constitutionality of mandates vis-avis the states and Congress.
1. Developing FederalistJurisprudence
The CAA has moved from a regulatory system embodying relative
cooperative federalism to one of command-and-control. The precipitous increase
in regulations to be administered by the states has accompanied the federal courts'
acquiescence to Congress's use of the commerce power. Since the Court's
decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,167
the Commerce Clause has been interpreted as an overarching grant of power to
Congress to regulate under the aegis of interstate commerce.
In upholding the National Labor Relations Act, the Court in Jones &
Laughlin "restricted" Congress's application of the Commerce Clause to those
activities that "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce
that their control is essential or appropriate to protect commerce from burdens and
'
obstructions."168
By abandoning earlier distinctions based upon the direct and
indirect effects of particular activities on commerce, the Court:
ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly
expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that
Clause. In part, this was a recognition of the great changes that
had occurred in the way business was carried on in this country.

165. U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
Exactly what powers, if any, are reserved to the states is wide open to debate. See United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941):
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it
was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new
national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the
states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
166. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
167. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
168. Id. at 37.
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Enterprises that had once been local or at most regional in nature
had become national in scope. But the doctrinal change also
reflected a view that earlier Commerce Clause cases artificially
had constrained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce. 169
2. Limitations on Infringements of State Sovereignty
Despite "recogni[tion] that there are attributes of sovereignty attach[ed]
to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress,"' 70 the
Supreme Court, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 7 '
replaced the unworkable traditional functions test with an examination of the
"political process" behind the enactment of a challenged statute. The Court
72
concluded that "laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated."'
Under prevailing Supreme Court decisions, a state must show that a statute was
borne of a seriously flawed political process to successfully claim a violation of
the Tenth Amendment.'73 The requisite burden of proof placed on the states led
to comments that judicial review simply does not apply to questions of federalism
when Congress acts under the Commerce Clause.' 74 The five-four decision in
Garcia has been modified, however, in subsequent decisions by the Supreme

169.
170.
171.
172.

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Id. at 556. The Court in Garcia stated the political process argument:
[W]e are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional
scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to-protect the "States as States" is one
of process rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise
of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature
of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible
failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a "sacred province
of state autonomy."
Id. at 554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)) (citation omitted). But see
Kaden, supra note 85 (arguing that national political process is unable to protect rights of states);
TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN

231-33 (1988) (quoting commentator Martha Derrick: "One wonders why, if the states' interests
are so well protected by the political branches, the issue reached the Supreme Court at all.").
173. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988). In Baker, the Court articulated that,
under Garcia,constitutional protection through the Tenth Amendment requires a showing of a
substantially flawed political process. Id.
174. William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709, 1721
(1985). "Since 1803 the court has claimed the authority ... to invalidate actions of the federal
government if they conflict with the constitution. The [Garcia] decisionseems to suggest that the
principle ofjudicial review does not apply to questions offederalism when congress acts under the
commerce clause." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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Court.
In New York, the Court reexamined state sovereignty issues in its review
of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act.'75 While upholding several
portions of the Act,176 the Court found that the "take-title" provision was an
unconstitutional infringement of a state's sovereignty. 7 7 The provision mandated
that a state must either regulate per Congress's direction or take title to low-level
radioactive waste.1 7 ' Because the choice was between two unconstitutional
choices, the Court found that there was no choice, in theory or in fact.' 79 Under
New York, Congress may neither compel states to enforce a federal regulatory
system nor encourage states to enforce such a system if the alternative to
enforcement is unconstitutional. 0 Consistent with this holding, Congress may,
for example, direct the states to regulate air pollution or subject the states'
residents to federal regulation. 8'
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court does recognize certain limitations
on Congress's power to condition funds, including requiring that all conditions
be rationally related to the federal expenditure.' 2 While the economic aspects are
dire for refusing to accept a CAA program, 83 "this kind of effect, standing alone,
8 4 Moreover, a
is insufficient to establish a violation of the Tenth Amendment."
"choice" does exist: develop a state program consistent with federal mandates or
capitulate and have the federal government regulate per federal mandates. As the
choice over regulation rests with the citizenry, accountability will be assured

175. Pub. L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842. See New York, 505 U.S. at 151-54 (discussing provisions of
Radioactive Waste Disposal Act).
176. See New York, 505 U.S. at 171-74.
177. Id. at 174-77.
178. See id. at 175.
179. Id. at 175-77. The Court points out that, unlike the other provisions, the take title provision
forces a state to either regulate according to federal instruction or "submit to another federal
instruction." Id. at 176. While such coercion is impermissible, Congress may: (1)attach
conditions to the receipt of federal funds, and (2) offer states the opportunity to regulate private
activity according to federal standards or have the federal government pre-empt state law. Id. at
166-67 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 206).
180. See William A. Hazeltine, New York v. United States: A New Restrictionon Congressional
Power Vis-A-Vis the States?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 253 (1994).
181. See New York, 505 U.S. at 174. "The affected States are not compelled by Congress to
regulate, because any burden caused by a State's refusal to regulate will fall on those who generate
[air pollution] and find no outlet for its disposal, rather than on the State as a sovereign." Id.
182. See supra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.
183. Seesupranotes 101-102, 111 (discussing economic ramifications that imposition of sanctions
would have upon Virginia and Missouri).
184. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 292 n.33 (discussing lack of effect that a potential economic impact has
upon a court's legal analysis of exercise of commerce power).
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under the formula dictated by New York.'85
Alas, we are faced with true form over substance: no state legislator
would deliberately forego highway funding, yet refusal to enact federal standards
would lead to such a result. While the Court abandoned categorizing direct
versus indirect effects in examining Commerce Clause challenges over half a
century ago,186 one must now determine whether congressional action is "good
coercion" or "bad coercion"-good coercion being when Congress gives a state
coercion when Congress gives you a choice
a choice between two evils and bad1 87
between two unconstitutional evils.
While the highway funding sanction faces a stiff constitutional battle, the
offset provision arguably violates the Tenth Amendment. Similar to the
unconstitutional options presented in New York,'8 8 a state-must regulate according
to federal standards under the CAA; if a state does not regulate according to the
CAA and, in the case of Virginia, open up its state courts, the state "takes title"
per federal order to a regional economic ban with all of the attendant
consequences, including losses in state tax revenues and economic development,
population emigration, and an increased need for state social welfare programs.' 89
Moreover, the offset order is permanent, as with the cut-off of highway funds,
until the state "assents" to operating a CAA program for the federal
government. 9 ' Once again there is the issue of "choice;" however, with the
offset provision it appears that the coercive choice is between two unconstitutional
evils. Congress has directed the states either to implement a federal program or
to discontinue economic development. "Accountability is thus diminished when,
due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with
the views of the local electorate in matters not preempted by federal
regulation."''

185. New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69. Unfortunately, such an arbitrary determination for achieving
accountability fails to account for the pressures faced by state officials and the citizenry's inability
to determine the source of the actions. While the highway sanction may not be technically
"coercive," an assumption could be made that few, if any, would choose to forego state regulation
in favor of federal regulation, given the massive differential between costs and benefits.
186. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
187. The distinction is based upon the Court's technical reading of coercion and compulsion. See
New York, 505 U.S. at 166-69. The implication is that Congress need only provide some
mechanism whereby the federal government allows a choice which could substantially impact the
citizenry but not directly impact the state. Yet, as with the highway cut-off funds, some decisions
are so untenable as to lack real choice, leaving accountability obscured as state legislators "do the
right thing."
188. Id. at 174-77.
189. See Smith, supra note 145 (discussing unconstitutionality of "economic ban"); supra notes
101-03, 110 (discussing economic and political consequences to Virginia and Missouri).
190. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
191. New York, 505 U.S. at 169 (citations omitted).
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The accountability of elected officials was also at stake in United States
v. Lopez.'92 The Court in Lopez declared unconstitutional Congress's use of the
commerce power to criminalize firearms in a school zone. 193 While the case did
not directly raise Tenth Amendment arguments, the decision is relevant to an
analysis of the constitutionality of the CAA because it: (1) acknowledged that
Congress is limited in its use of the commerce power, (2) continued a judicial
trend that narrows the holding in Garcia, and (3) explicitly recognized the
advantages of a balanced federal system.'9 4
In Lopez, the government argued that the Gun-Free School Zone Act of
1990 was constitutionally fit under the Commerce Clause because possession of
a firearm in a school zone may lead to violence; violence, in turn, may create
interstate costs, reduce citizens' willingness to travel, and hamper the educational
process, leading inevitably to a less productive nation.'95 Refusing to uphold such
a broad interpretation of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, the Court
stated:
[W]e would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner
that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained
by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken
long steps down that road, giving great deference to
congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has
suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we here
decline to proceed any further. . . .This we are unwilling to
96
do. 1
The Court concluded that to proceed further would ignore the Constitution's
specification of enumerated powers which distinguishes between "what is truly
national and what is truly local."' 97
. Similarly, Congress blurred the distinctions between "what is national and
what is local" under the CAA. While air pollution undoubtedly has national
impact, the imposition of draconian sanctions coerces states into acting as federal
surrogates. This results in inefficiency and dispels the inherent advantages of a

192. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
193. Id. at 1630-31.
194. Id. at 1630-34.
195. Id. at 1632. The Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp.
V 1993).
196. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
197. Id.The Court specifically noted that the Commerce Clause must be understood in the context
of a "dual system" of government. Id.at 1626.
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federal system which embraces diversity, accountability and political freedom.' 9 8
In many ways, interstate air pollution highlights the changing nature of federalism
and its ability to encompass federal efforts to protect natural resources and public
health. It does not necessarily follow, however, that Congress may unilaterally
disparage state sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment through top-down fixes-it
is a question of the manner and the method by which Congress acts.
One apparent solution to constitutional usurpation rests in the judiciary's
"duty to insure that the federal-state balance is not destroyed."' 99 Supporters of
the legislative branch may point to potential congressional abdication of problems
which are properly addressed by the federal government due to "legal
uncertainty" as to the ability of Congress to regulate a specific activity. Yet,
"[a]ny possible benefit [from providing greater legal certainty] . . . would be at
the expense of the Constitution's system of enumerated powers. "200
In so holding, the Court in Lopez further tightened the noose around
Congress's apparent unbridled political power in the wake of Garcia. Arguments
that the political process assures a proper federal balance ignore the fact that "the
federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too
vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one
or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far." ' 201
E. Outcome
Perhaps as Justice Thomas wrote, it is time to "refashion[] a coherent test
that does not tend to 'obliterate the distinction between what is national and what
is local and create a completely centralized government. ' ' 212 The sanctions
provisions in the 1990 Amendments tend to blur the lines of accountability and,
*by doing so, disrupt the tenuous federal-state balance. The Tenth Amendment
and Spending Clause provide ample authority upon which states should be granted
relief from the coercive mandates in the 1990 Amendments. Moreover, Virginia
and Missouri suits are likely to be joined by other states as the voluminous detail

198. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text; Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638-39 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (discussing merits of federalism and necessity of preserving dual system).
199. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 1633. Unlike the narrow differentiation of coercion that the Court pursued in New York,
the Court in Lopez appears less concerned with creating an easy bright-line standard, and more
concerned with interpreting the Constitution as a federalist document, not necessarily given to easy
answers.
201. Id. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In an apparent direct refutation of the political process
argument driving Garcia,Justice Kennedy argues: "the absence of structural mechanisms to require
those [federal] officials to undertake this principled task [of maintaining the federal balance], and
the momentary political convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue against a
complete renunciation of the judicial role." Id.
202. Id. at 1643.
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of the 1990 Amendments is digested. °3 Unfortunately, due to a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, Virginia was unable to present its arguments to the federal
district court. 2 4 However, Virginia still has an appeal pending on the disapproval
of Virginia's CAA program. Regardless of the outcome, the issues surrounding
the role of federalism in the CAA remain: what is the proper role of the states
and the EPA, and how should Congress best respond to air pollution, a matter of
obvious national urgency?
V. OUTLOOK

Difficulties with the implementation of the 1990 Amendments run the
gamut; political, legislative, judicial and administrative problems hamper any
possibility for long-term success in reducing and controlling air pollution.
Undoubtedly, there has been substantial progress since the era of killer smog.
Unfortunately, however, increasing population and consumption patterns, reliance
on automobiles, and the need to target not only major sources, but also the tens
of thousands of laundries, gas stations, barbecues and other small sources, make
the going much tougher. The ability to solve these problems does not lie within
the current environmental regulatory system. Moreover, the very assumptions that
justified the regulatory structure of the CAA no longer remain persuasive. Such
a realization demands a reexamination of the federal balance and the roles that
state and executive environmental agencies play. While the literature is replete
with suggestions on how to "fix" the EPA and the CAA, the goal should be to
develop an environmental partnership that maximizes the benefits of federalism.

203. While Virginia and Missouri are the only states currently challenging the CAA on Tenth
Amendment grounds, several states face sanctions and are likely to file suit if Virginia and Missouri
succeed; regardless, many states would probably join in any appellate action. See Paul Kemezis,
States' Revolt Against EPA Emissions Rules Is Growing, 8 ENV'T WEEK No. 2, Jan. 12, 1995.
Moreover, plans to introduce low-emission vehicles in twelve Eastern states pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 751! c has sparked a constitutional controversy. The Ozone Transport Commission was set up by
Congress to deal with smog problems in the Northeast, but states and industry argue that it would
be more effective to introduce a 49-state plan. Opponents of the Commission argue that it forces
states to form a regional government agency without state consent, permits representatives not to
be accountable to residents and creates problematic distinctions among the 38 states not included.
See generally,Attorneys Say LEV Section of CAA Could Face ConstitutionalChallenge, CLEAN AIR
NETWORK ONLINE TODAY, Dec. 29, 1994, available in WESTLAW; Constitutionality of OTC
Actions Upheld in Memo from Justice DepartmentAttorney, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1687 (Jan. 6,
1995).
204. Virginia v. United States, No. 3:95-CV-21 (E.D. Va. June 12, 1995). Relying upon Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, 788 F.Supp. 268 (E.D. Va. 1992), the court found that when
a challenge to the EPA's authority to act is embedded in a challenge to a specific action, the claim
can only be heard by an appellate court. Id. at 15. The impact of this decision, as noted by the
court, will be Virginia's inability to utilize the district court's broad discovery powers to strengthen
its constitutional challenges. Id. at 8-12.

1995]

CANARY IN A COAL MINE?

A. State Capabilities
When the original call to action was made to curb air pollution, states
were seemingly unable, or unwilling, to act decisively." 5 Over the past twenty
years, however, states have not only increased their capabilities to protect air
quality, but they have also taken the lead in enacting, regulating and enforcing air
pollution controls.2" 6 Fifty states are capable of brainstorming and experimenting
in a way that a single government is unable to do, leading to innovation and
sharing of what is successful and what is not.20 7 In addition, states have the
advantage of proximity to the sources and share in a number of administrative
strengths not found on the federal level.20 8 Finally, it is useful to remember in

205. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
206. Calculations made by the Congressional Budget Office in 1987 estimated that 80% of all
governmental environmental expenditures were made on the state and local level. See Elliott, supra
note 4, at 1. Additionally, state capabilities in enforcement have been proven since the first
environmental enactments.
[G]iven the huge enforcement workload, Congress and EPA must begin to view
environmental enforcement as a true partnership effort. While the partnership
terminology has long been used by EPA, the actual federal-state relationship has
been closer to that of a parent watching over an unreliable child than a
relationship of equals.
Humphrey & Paddock, supra note 21, at 40.
Moreover, many states are not only regulating but are also breaking new ground, and the
EPA should nourish these efforts.
See Portney et al., supra note 23, at 1473.
State
environmentalism has also led to more active state legislatures and increasingly sophisticated
environmental agencies. Id. Whereas before, environmental groups were primarily active on the
national front, the locus of environmental activity has increasingly shifted toward the state level with
the rise in grass roots organizations and decentralization of national environmental advocacy groups.
Id.
207. See David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It's Time for a New Look to Our "Laboratories
of Democracies" in the Effort To Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L.
REv. 347, 354 (1994) (quoting J. William Futrell that "[tihe prospects for early innovation and
experimentation on the state level are better than in Washington"); John Pendergrass, A Rich History
of State Innovation, ENVTL. FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 12 (describing recent innovative efforts by
states and formation of organization that acts as clearinghouse for state environmental efforts); John
Pendergrass, State Savvy on Superfund, ENVTL. FORUM, May-June 1994, at 6 (noting contributions
of states toward reduction of risks from contaminated sites and innovations developed in regulating
Comprehensive Environmental Remediation and Cleanup Act); BRYNER, supra note 10, at 183
(noting that "[i]nnovative states will find ways to go beyond the Clean Air Act in devising effective
air pollution programs").
208. See William M. Eichbaum, State/FederalRelations in EnvironmentalProtection: How Will
They Evolve in the 1980's?, in TAKING STOCK, supra note 2, at 26. States enjoy a number of
administrative strengths which are not found on the federal level: (1) state decisionmakers are more
accessible, (2) states can tailor environmental programs to actual conditions and needs, (3) intimacy
with actual problems in the field breeds innovative solutions, (4) more people are involved on the
state level, than are on the national level in environmental management, and (5) the presence of the
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considering the appropriate role of the states that, "[t]o a large extent, the future
of clean air lies in the hands of state officials. 2 °9
The federal government's "can do" spirit contributed to the centralization
of air pollution planning and control under the CAA. More and more often, as
states grapple with air pollution and develop regulatory and administrative
expertise, they are "assuming responsibilities that go far beyond those of hand
maiden to the federal government. '21° While a state's enthusiasm to take the lead
should not be exaggerated, neither should it be ignored."' Regardless of the
various successes, some may still point to state environmental programs as an
example of regulatory failure, concluding that states have inadequate
constitutional principles, barriers to environmental legislation, deficiencies in
judicial principles and perspectives, and problematic regulatory structures. 21 2 Yet,
in examining the 1990 Amendments, similar problems surfaced, but on the greatly
magnified national scale. It is doubtful that all of the states have experienced an
environmental epiphany, climaxed through efficient allocation of environmental
resources so as to maximize societal welfare. However, this is not a logical
reason to punish the many for the actions of the few. Finally, regulatory failure
in the 1990 Amendments serves as an example in the great laboratory of
democracy of what not to do and may guide officials toward the proper path-not
simply the beaten one.
In many ways, claims of regulatory failure are linked to the race-to-thebottom argument, so popularized in the 1970s as a principal justification for
federal intervention and regulation.21 3 In fact, the CAA can largely be explained
by reference to the race-to-the-bottom argument.2" 4 Even assuming that a race-tothe-bottom does exist between states in environmental regulation, the
establishment of federal control over air pollution "would not necessarily be an
appropriate response." 2" Federal environmental regulation may result in a state's

advantages listed above could lead to more efficient solutions. Id

209.

BRYNER,

supra note 10, at 183.

210. Portney et al., supra note 23, at 1472-73 (noting that state advances in environmental
management capabilities have led to a mindset of "we can do this better ourselves").
211. See Markell, supra note 207, at 353-54 (citations omitted):
[Miany states have tossed away their recalcitrant stance toward strong
environmental programs, and in many instances state governments, not 'the
feds,' are at the forefront in efforts to protect the environment .... [Sitates
occupy an increasingly prominent role in environmental regulation and that
considerable innovation has occurred at the state and local levels, making these
governmental efforts especially rich mines to explore.
212. See Butler, supra note 21.
213. See Revesz, supra note 34, at 1210-11.

214. Id. at 1224-27 (discussing congressional justification of CAA provisions on the race-to-thebottom theory). Id. at 1227 (pointing out that an alternate rationale for promulgation of CAA,
eliminating interstate air pollution, has "proven remarkably ineffective").
215. Id.at 1245.
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lessening of other regulatory interests. Thus the benefits of federal regulation
should be compared to the negative effects of lessened regulation in other areas,
such as worker safety.2 6 Using the race-to-the-bottom argument to justify federal
environmental regulation challenges the core of a dual system of government.2
Under the race-to-the-bottom theory, if the federal government regulates air
pollution, states would logically lessen other regulatory interests in order to attract
industry.2 18 The federal government would then be justified, under the race-tothe-bottom theory, in regulating those areas as well in order to prevent interstate
competition over socially beneficial regulation.2" 9 "States will simply respond by
competing over another variable. Thus, the only logical answer is to eliminate
the possibility of any competition altogether. In essence, then, the race-to-thebottom argument is an argument against federalism." 0
While the foregoing discussion has assumed that such a race may exist,
there is little in the way of theoretical support for such a conclusion. 22' Anecdotal
evidence usually attempts to link a state's reticence to regulate above federal
standards as evidence that in the absence of federal regulation, states would have
a race-to-the-bottom.22 2 State enactment of "minimal stringency" laws, however,
may recognize the regulatory confusion of duplicative and conflicting standards
or indicate that federal standards may be appropriate for a given state's needs.
Since the 1970s, states have been constrained in their regulation and control of
air pollution. Thus, it dispels logic to conclude the existence of a "race" in which
no state has ever gotten to the starting line in the age of modem environmental
policymaking.
Interstate competition is neither inconsistent with the maximization of
societal welfare, nor do states compete for economic development by offering
increasingly lax standards in a manner contrary to state interests.22 3 It is not lost
upon state leaders that high per capita income is tied to stringent regulation of the
environment. To concede the fallacy of the race-to-the-bottom argument does
not, however, mandate capitulation by the federal government in environmental
policy. Rather, it points to the need to review the structure of the federal-state
relationship in terms of the operating assumptions so as to maximize the
216. Id.at 1245-46.
217. Id.at 1245.
218. Id.at 1245-47.
219. Id.(noting need to eventually eliminate all state autonomy as states progressively lower other
regulatory standards to match federal government regulations in order to stop race-to-thebottom-points to radical underinclusivity of federal environmental regulations).
220. Id.at 1247.
221. Id.at 1242.
222. See McElfish, supra note 33, at 1006-07 (concluding that states' enactment of minimal
stringency laws indicates that, in absence of federal regulation, states would not regulate
environment to same degree as federal government).
223. See Revesz, supra note 34, at 1242-44.
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relationship.
B. Restructuringthe Federal-StateRelationship
Simply because a problem is national in scope does not automatically
make it a federal issue or appropriate for federal resolution. 22 4 Rather, the aim
of federalism should be to take advantage of the benefits of centralization while
avoiding the drawbacks.225 Although the CAA may have been primarily justified
on a race-to-the-bottom argument, the federal government should and must
regulate where state regulation would be inefficient due to negative externalities;
e.g., the transfer of air pollution from one state to another.22 6 This scenario does
not, however, grant carte blanche to the federal government to continue the
current command and control regulatory system. Such a compromise would
ignore the guarantees of federalism, innovation, diversity, accountability, and the
security of political liberty.227
While there exist numerous prescriptions to heal the system, the best
advice recognizes that clean air demands a partnership. In the words of Governor
E. Benjamin Nelson: "I was elected governor-not administrator of federal
programs in Nebraska. '' 221 Several factors would aid in making a leaner, meaner
air pollution program, while at the same time realizing the advantages of a dual
system of government.
First, states must be part of the problem, not the problem. While the
EPA, through congressional dictates, once enjoyed a monopoly in both technical
expertise and policymaking, that is no longer the case.229 Much of the states'
frustration stems from a regulatory system in which "one of the parties has the
luxury of taking the lead in developing policies that somebody else has the
2'' 3 °
responsibility to implement and to fund.
The future of air pollution control will necessarily come from more
numerous, smaller sources.2 1' Because air pollution control may require personal
sacrifices in consumption, transportation, and conservation, life-style changes will
be more easily affected by institutions closer in proximity to the sources-states

224. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987) (instituting federalist principles within
executive branch).
225. See LeBoeuf, supra note 28, at 557.
226. Id. at 591. See John Milne, Maine Blames Massachusetts, Othersfor PollutingAir, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 2, 1995, at 20 (citing New England states that are filing requests with the EPA to stop
other states from polluting their air).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 75-88.
228. Reuben, supra note 6, at 78.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 194-97.
230. Elliott, supra note 4, at 2.
231. See Futrell, supra note 24, at 119; Pearlstein, supra note 46, at HI. While many gains have
been made in pollution control, "[tihe 'better safe than sony' approach was useful in stimulating
the first 90 percent of cleanup but is not practical for the last 10 percent." Id.
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and localities.232 Disregarding Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress could
enact statutes curtailing emissions from Billy Bob's Laundry or Wanda's Bar and
Grill. Absent real state participation, however, Congress would doom any
likelihood for success.233
Second, success entails flexibility. "Agency forcing" statutes do not allow
for effective policy decisions on either end,234 and the 1990 Amendment's
voluminous detail produces waste and inefficiency.235 From an economic
standpoint, "consistency is the hobgoblin of simple minds." While industry
desires uniformity in environmental regulation, inflexibility leads to "arbitrariness,
'
As EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner recently
inequity, and waste."236
pledged: "If we are to clean up our air, we need to move beyond the one-sizefits-all approach and work toward flexibility and innovation-solutions that work
'
Diversity and innovation, hallmarks of a
for real people, real communities."237
some vehicle for their institutionalization
without
forgotten
are
system,
federalist
within the CAA.
Third, along with demands for greater flexibility by both the EPA and the
states, is the need for less oversight in the CAA. One current point of contention
concerns the Title V operating permit program.238 Proposals to allow states to
shield permitees from regulations after a permit was issued and to let states
change SIPs without formal revision were not included in the 1990
Amendments.239 Consequently, sources refrain from making investments in
pollution control technology until a regulation mandates compliance; otherwise
sources run the risk of wasting resources on obsolete equipment.240 Moreover,
many states that had operating permit programs prior to the 1990 Amendments

232. See Futrell, supra note 24, at 119.
233. See BRYNER, supra note 10, at 183:
The impact of the Clean Air Act of 1990 may extend beyond air pollution.
Environmental legislation, and clean air laws in particular, have aroused high
expectations about the capacity of government to solve pressing problems.
When such legislation is not aggressively implemented, because of
underfunding, policy disputes, and partisan posturing, the public becomes more
cynical about law, politics, and government in general.
234. See Elliott, supra note 4, at 2.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 60, 68-73.
236. BRYNER, supra note 10, at 28.
237. EPA Administrator, supra note 7.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
239. See JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG & CRAIG N. OREN, I CLEAN AIR AcT: LAW AND PRACTICE
14.1 (1993).
240. Id.

§
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accuse the EPA of overreaching the CAA requirements.2 4 State frustration over
EPA oversight boils down to three points: (1) attention to details versus broad
policy objectives, (2) delay in performing oversight, and (3) the so-called "late
hits"-the EPA is failing to present objections to permitting decisions until it is
too late, thus requiring permitees to start the process all over again.242
Finally, air pollution regulators should continue to look both outward and
upward. Both states and the EPA should embrace efforts by industry and
recognize that, given the opportunity, the private sector knows more than the
states and the EPA in how to reduce pollution.243 Active participation of industry
serves both the regulators and the public. 244 It should not be forgotten that
individuals can often perform services in the private sector and thus obviate the
need for increased government expenditures.
VI. CONCLUSION

While much progress has occurred since the passage of the CAA, much
more remains to be done. Unfortunately, given the legislative, judicial,
constitutional and structural barriers placed upon the 1990 Amendments, success
is not likely in the long term. Regardless of the outcome, the constitutional
challenges by Virginia and Missouri symbolize the "death of the canary" and
signal the need either to deal with the problem or to get out of the "coal mine."
The focus of efforts to reform the CAA must turn now toward the values of
federalism and acknowledge that a dual system demands a partnership, not an
overlord.
EPA's success should be a priority for all its stakeholders,

241. See Renewed Operating Permit Rule To Be Released This Spring, Will Account for State
Concerns,25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1863 (Feb. 3, 1995). An earlier proposed rule requiring
EPA oversight over all minor new source reviews would have led to a continual permit review
process as industries made routine changes, placing a large burden on regulators. Id. The EPA has
since said that it would revise the review process, requiring oversight of only the "most
environmentally significant minor NSR changes." See Changes, supra note 80, at 2285.
242. See Elliott, supra note 4, at 2.
243. See Pearlstein, supra note 46, at H4 (describing the inefficiency resulting from a requirement
to remove benzene from a waste water treatment facility when four times the reduction could have
been achieved at one sixth of the price by reducing emissions from another process); STENSVAAG
& OREN, supra note 239, § 14.1:
Often SIPs do not use the most cost-effective strategy for attaining the ambient
standards. State and federal officials cannot be expected to have industry's
detailed knowledge about the cheapest ways to comply; moreover, governmental
officials may prefer, for administrative convenience, uniform rules that fall short
of ideal cost-efficiency.
244. In addition to restructuring efforts to regulate, there may be a need to broaden air pollution
control policy, integrating air pollution controls with meaningful land use and energy policies. See
REITZE, supra note 10, at 1643.
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including those who often oppose the agency, because the price
of failure in environmental policy making is unacceptably high.
To rebuild EPA's mission and credibility, supporters and critics
should join together to build a centrist agenda-one that
recognizes the need for continued environmental progress and a
strong agency but advocates fundamental administrative and
statutory reforms to bring about new priorities, decision-making
models, and partnerships.24 5

245. Sussman, supra note 65, at 23.

